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Public Morality and Free Expression:
The Judicial Search for Principles
Of Reconciliation
By HARRY CLoR*
The decisions of the Supreme Court in Miller v. Californial and
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton2 represent a crucial effort to resolve
basic issues in the difficult area of obscenity law, and the Court's gen-
eral resolution of the competing interests involved seems to be a
reasonable compromise. A great deal of governmental action is based
upon improving the general quality of life in our society. This goal
is certainly the basis, for example, of environmental regulation, and also
seems to be at the heart of most social welfare legislation. There is
no doubt that we accept a view of governmental power and the proper
ends of governmental action that is considerably broader, and properly
so, than that espoused by John Stuart Mill.3 In Paris, the Court recog-
nized that this interest in the quality of life would justify the legal regu-
lation of obscenity,4 for there is little doubt that a society without ob-
scene publications and without obscene motion pictures is preferable
to one in which obscenity provides a major source of pleasure for some
* B.A., 1951, Lawrence College; M.A., 1963, Ph.D., 1968, University of
Chicago. Professor and Chairman, Department of Political Science, Kenyon College.
1. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
2. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
3. "Mhe sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively,
in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civil-
ized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." J.S. Mill, On Liberty,
in Trm UTurrARiANs 483-84 (1961). An effective refutation of Mill's argument is
found in J. STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY (1874). For a contemporary re-
vival of the same basic controversy, compare H. HART, LAw, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY
(1963), with P. DEvLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALs (1965). The important point,
however, is that Mill's theory is only one theory, and it is not a theory that the Constitu-
tion imposes on the legislative process. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
68 (1973); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
4. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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segment of the population. And it should be clear to anyone who
has visited a major city in the last few years that the increasing avail-
ability of such materials has a general effect on the quality of that city's
environment, affecting equally those who have no interest in obscene
materials.
This communal concern for the quality of life' is clearly held by
the majority of the population, as is proved by the very existence of
obscenity legislation. However, this communal concern is limited by
the vital first amendment interests in the protection of serious literature
and the communication of ideas. By limiting censorship to prurient
and patently offensive depictions of "hard core sexual conduct" specifi-
cally defined by state law,' the Court has excluded from the definition
of obscenity that which is serious literature and that which communi-
cates ideas. 7 This test thus recognizes two important and somewhat
competing public interests; the interest in the quality of life, and the
interest in protection of literature and ideas. Although the first
amendment represents an important value in our society, it is not the
only value, and the recognition of these other values has been implicit
in first amendment analysis since the original formulation of the "clear
and present danger" test." It is still present in the reduced protection
available to commercial speech,9 to "fighting words,"'" and to libel,'
and should be equally present in a reduced protection for obscenity.
5. For fuller discussions of the concept of quality of life as it relates to pornog-
raphy, see H. CLOR, OSCENTY AND PUBLIC MORALITY (1969); Kristol, Pornography,
Obscenity, and the Case for Censorship, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1971, § 6 (Magazine),
at 24.
6. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
7. Under Miller, obscenity is defined to exclude that which has "serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. at 24. This is analagous to the law in the
United Kingdom, where it is an affirmative defense to an obscenity prosecution that the
publication is in the public good in that it is "in the interests of science, literature, art
or learning, or of other objects of general concern." Obscene Publications Act of 1964,
c. 74, amending Obscene Publications Act of 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66, § 4.
8. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.).
9. Commercial speech was at one time completely excluded from first amend-
ment protection. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). It is now subject
to a balancing process which gives considerably more weight to the state interests in-
volved than would exist for other types of expression. See Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413
U.S. 376 (1973).
10. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
11. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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The exclusion of obscenity from first amendment protection is not
inconsistent with full protection of ideas and literature, as is indicated
by the Court's decision in Jenkins v. Georgia,12 in which the motion
picture Carnal Knowledge was held to be clearly within the protection
of the first amendment. This decision establishes beyond any doubt
that, regardless of local community standards, a motion picture cannot
be declared obscene merely because of its predominant sexual theme
and scenes of nudity. Jenkins stands as evidence that the fears of the
libertarians are groundless. The Supreme Court stands ready to pre-
vent the suppression of that which is not grossly prurient and offensive.13
The suppression of obscenity will not lead to the suppression of serious
artistic endeavors, and it will not lead to the suppression of legitimate
ideas. As long as this protection is available, the preservation of the
quality of communal life can be accomplished without harming that
which the first amendment was in reality designed to protect.
Subsequent cases raise perplexing questions of a different order.
In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,14 the Supreme Court re-
quired the city of Chattanooga to make its Memorial Auditorium avail-
able for a production of the rock musical Hair, a performance charac-
terized by nudity, simulated sex, and vulgar language. The court held
that withholding the municipal facility amounted to a prior restraint and
that the city failed to provide the procedural safeguards constitutionally
imposed upon prior restraints.15 But as Justice Rehnquist's dissent
points out, the municipal theater, unlike streets and parks, "must of
necessity schedule performances by a process of inclusion and exclu-
sion." ' In allocating limited theater availability among a great number
of possible productions, the municipal board had to decide which pro-
ductions would appeal to the broadest audience. Consequently, Rehn-
quist argued, the denial of the application should not have been held
a prior restraint.' 7  Certainly a municipal or state government may ex-
pend its resources to provide recreational and artistic facilities. These
activities are one way of promoting the quality of life in a community.
If a municipality is to have no control over the use of the facilities it
12. 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
13. It is significant that Jenkins was decided not on the basis of the existence of
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, but on the basis of the absence of prurient
interest and patent offensiveness. Id. at 161. It is clear that the Supreme Court stands
ready to review erroneous determinations of any of the elements of the Miller test.
14. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
15. Id. at 560-62.
16. Id. at 570.
17. Id. at 573-74.
erects, the inevitable result will be that no such facilities are built, and
public funds will be expended for other purposes. The net result of
the decision, then, may be actually to reduce the availability of forums
for expression, for there is certainly nothing in the Constitution that
would require any city to build a municipal auditorium. When a per-
formance is staged in a municipal facility, especially one which is not,
like a park, traditionally reserved for the open expression of views, the
city is lending a dignity of official approval to the performances that
are staged there. There seems little reason why public facilities must
be made available for the preachings of a fascist group on racial hatred,
and there is similarly no reason why a city must sanction a performance
like Hair. The very nature of an auditorium is such as to dedicate it
to artistic or educational purposes. Therefore, it is not inconsistent for
the city to make the artistic and educational judgments which follow
naturally from the very nature of the facility."a While the first amend-
ment should play a part in a judgment such as this, first amendment
interests are not as compelling when a city denies a production the use of
a municipal forum as when it affirmatively precludes the production
from being presented anywhere. The recognition of a valid municipal
interest in the quality of life in that municipality would allow more dis-
cretion to those who allocate the use of the city's facilities than it does
to those who enforce the city's criminal laws.
Thus, recognition of a greater state interest where the government
owns the facilities involved might lead to a different result in cases like
Southeastern Promotions. But while this governmental interest seems
valid, some governmental interests may be so tenuous as to preclude
any content discrimination. Thus, there appears to be little problem
with the Court's decision in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,9
where it invalidated an ordinance forbidding drive-in theaters from ex-
hibiting films containing any nudity when the screen was visible from
a public place. Mr. Justice Powell's majority opinion declared that
"the limited privacy interest of persons on the public streets cannot
justify this censorship of otherwise protected speech on the basis of its
content."2  Nor could the ordinance be justified as a protection of
children, since it indiscriminately encompasses all nudity, however inno-
cent and regardless of content or context. The Erznoznik decision
18. See generally Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 795-98 (1st
Cir. 1976); Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920
(1968).
19. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
20. Id. at 212.
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quite properly supports freedom of expression against a heavy-handed
restriction which overprotects the communal interests involved. Al-
though the result in Erznoznik is correct, it is wrong to assume that
the community's interest in regulating open sexuality is no greater than
its interest in regulating sexuality in magazines and closed theaters.
Although the quality of communal life is implicated and involved in
both, the interests are even greater where the sexuality is publicly
visible, and therefore the balance to be applied in these cases should
reflect that greater interest.
This is exactly what the Court did, and properly so, in Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc.21 There the Court sanctioned Detroit's
effort to preserve communal quality of life through a zoning ordinance
requiring geographic dispersal of adult theaters and bookshops. Since
the overall effect of these activities on our inner cities is obvious, and
since no total suppression was involved, the compromise reached in
Young seems promising. A city can protect its neighborhoods from
moral and social decay without resort to the constant surveillance and
repressive crackdowns which may have an even greater inhibiting ef-
fect on valuable expression.22 Young is most encouraging because it
recognizes the balancing process that is inevitable in this area and ap-
proves of efforts to improve the quality of life which are designed to
minimize the amount of actual suppression involved.
The decisions in Southeastern Promotions, Erznoznik, and Young
raise an issue which has now become central in the controversy over
obscenity. In each of these cases there was some effort to regulate
expression which is, arguably, within the area of protected speech. In
each case, the regulation, while falling far short of actual suppression,
would involve some degree of restriction based upon a judgment about
the character or the content of the expression. 3 Is this legitimate, and
can the Court consistently reject this kind of regulation in Erznozik
and allow it in Young? Libertarians answer in the negative.
The position is that selective regulation based on content may
extend only to outright pornography determined to be legally obscene
in a judicial proceeding; all other materials or expressive activity,
21. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
22. It is not unlikely that most of the magazines, books, or films distributed or
shown by the establishments covered by the Young ordinance were legally obscene under
the Miller standards, and therefore could have been completely banned if prosecutorial
resources had been available.
23. On the issue of content regulation, see Karst, Equality as a Central Principle
in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHm. L. Rlv. 20 (1975).
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however borderline, must be totally free of any legal control whatso-
ever. Thus, the argument is: that which meets the stringent legal tests
for obscenity may be censored; that which does not is subject to no
restraints whatever except for wholly content-neutral "time, place and
manner" 24 regulations. If this principle is taken literally, then public
authority is impotent to protect the community from salacious pictorial
materials or other expression (falling just short of the legally obscene)
located outside theaters or on bill boards or in the public parks. Thus,
advocates of this "strict dichotomy" approach may incorporate a modi-
fication of the principle which allows for the protection of captive audi-
ences from the most coercively obstrusive kinds of public display. 25 But
if this is a valid exception to the equality principle, then why cannot we
have equally valid exceptions which relate to the use of municipal facili-
ties, as in Southeastern Promotions, or nonsuppressive zoning restrictions
designed to prevent urban deterioration, as in Young? Surely the
interests there represented are as valid as the interest in protecting the
captive audience. Moreover, even with exceptions the equality argu-
ment seems too rigid to accommodate the variety of circumstances and
competing values. The public interest in freedom for deviant forms
of expression is heavily favored at the expense of public interests in
moral and aesthetic standards, tranquility, and dignity in communal life.
Thus, rejection of the Young result strongly favors those who would like
to see more of the Times Square phenomenon without regard to the
fact that there are many who would like to see less of it. It is true
that the first amendment commands that the balance must be weighted
heavily on the side of expression, 2  but the first amendment does not
mandate that there can be no other interests thrown into the balance. -7
24. See generally N. DORSEN, P. BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, 1 EMERSON, HABER &
DORSEN'S POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 438-58 (4th ed. 1976).
25. See, e.g., Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM.
L. REy. 669, 677-81 (1963). A similar exception is advocated by those who would re-
move any restrictions as to consenting adults. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Gerber, A Suggested Solution to the Riddle of Ob-
scenity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 834 (1964).
26. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958), indicating that procedures
must take account of the fact that freedom of speech is a "transcedent value" entitled
to more weight in the balance than other values.
27. The absolute position of Justices Black and Douglas has never been adopted
by a majority of the Court. N. DoRsEN, P. BENDER & B. NEuBoRNE, 1 EMERSON,
HABER & DORSEN'S POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 59 (4th ed.
1976); see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563 (1968); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961). See generally
Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
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In this borderline area between protected speech and unprotected
obscenity, it seems reasonable to strike the balance a bit more evenly.
The difficult problem, however, is the formulation of an adequate
principle to recognize these competing values. Can rational lines be
drawn in this twilight zone? The rulings both in Erznoznik and Young
accord with common sense. Perhaps they can be saved from the con-
tradiction suggested by critics through a common sense consideration of
the communal interests at stake in each case. There is no doubt that the
protection of juveniles is a valid interest.28  But that hardly jus-
tifies the sweeping provisions of the Erznoznik ordinance. Rather, the
Erznoznik ordinance looks to its justification primarily in the privacy
interests of persons in the streets. These interests, however, are still
weak, since the first amendment seems to require us to see and hear
much which may offend us.29
In Young, however, the concern of the Detroit ordinance is the
preservation of neighborhoods from deterioration. The ordinance was
designed to protect against the congregation of prostitutes and their as-
sociates, drug traffic, and a general decline in the moral and aesthetic
attractiveness of the city with the consequent departure of legitimate
businesses and residents. The public interest at stake is arguably much
more substantial in Young than it was in Erznoznik. The preservation
of communities (and communal bonds and communal spirit) should be
given considerable weight at a time when this vital ingredient of human
well-being is undermined by so many forces of modern life, commer-
cial, technological, and pluralistic. The atomistic view of man repre-
sented by the philosophy of John Stuart Mill was probably erroneous
even when On Liberty was written.3" It is certainly erroneous now.
While individual freedom is an important value, there are other values
which are no less important, and the concept of community must be
considered to be one of them. And there can be little doubt that one
of the major elements contributing to or detracting from the sense of
community is the moral and aesthetic atmosphere which prevails in
public places. If we did not think that this were important, we would
not spend so much effort and money on urban and public beautifica-
tion. If we acknowledge that there are things which can make our
28. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. ;29 (1968). See generally Dibble, Oh-
scenity: A State Quarantine to Protect Children, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 345 (1966).
29. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
30. M. LERNER, Preface to On Liberty, in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART
MILL 249-52 (1961). See generally M. COWLm, MILL AND LxmEALism (1963).
cities more livable, then we must acknowledge that there are things
which make our cities less livable. It is true that these considerations
are not susceptible of scientific proof, but that does not mean that they
can be ignored. It can be argued that the crucial problem of contempo-
rary America is more a declining sense of community than a decreasing
amount of free speech. What I am suggesting, then, is that we recog-
nize this communal interest as a valid interest, just as even the most
vigorous opponents of obscenity laws have recognized valid interests
in protection of children and protection of personal privacy. The inter-
est in community is no less valid. In fact, I find the interests that De-
troit is trying to protect considerably more important than the interest
in preventing a fleeting glance at nudity which was the source of the
ordinance in Erznoznik.
It cannot be denied that some suppression is inevitable in the
economic results of the Detroit ordinance." And it is not suggested
that there are no interests that would tend to weigh on the other side
of community interests. 2  But, as Mr. Justice Stevens points out in
Young, "there is surely a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition
of material that is on the borderline between pornography and artistic
expression than in the free dissemination of ideas of social and political
significance . . . . This is content discrimination, but content dis-
crimination is inherent in the general settlement of the obscenity
problem represented by Miller and Paris Adult Theatre. It is inherent
in the general settlement of the problems of libel and commercial
speech as well.3 4  All that Mr. Justice Stevens has done is to make ex-
plicit what is implicit in the Miller interpretation of the first amend-
ment- that its essential concern is to protect the communication of
ideas and works of "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value. '' 35  This interpretation is thoroughly consistent with American
constitutional and political tradition36 and more logical than an interpre-
31. Thus, it is possible that the dispersal mandated by the ordinance would make
it economically unfeasible for some businesses to continue in operation. If there were,
as a result, fewer adult bookstores and adult theatres, it is thus conceivable that some
materials will not be available which would be available if there were more businesses
to promulgate them.
32. I am not suggesting that the first amendment interests have no part to play
in the balance, but rather that they are not the only factor.
33. 427 U.S. at 61.
34. See notes 9-11 supra. In these areas the Court must weigh the truth, the value,
and the effect of the material. This is surely a form of content regulation.
35. 413 U.S. at 24.
36. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). It is instructive that obscenity
regulation in the United States existed for generations before there was even any sugges-
tion that the first amendment was involved at all. See generally F. SCmAuER, THE LAW
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tation that would protect all words and all pictures at the expense of
every other value in society.17  The concept of absolute equality is a
simple but unrealistic and unworkable solution to the complexity of in-
terests represented by modem life.
Essential to a proper balance among the interests involved is that
diminished protection is not the same as absolute suppression. Free-
dom for serious literature and serious discussion requires a rather large
zone of security. I do not deny the concept of the "chilling effect."' s8
Therefore, it seems inadvisable to completely suppress the worthless
vulgarities purveyed by many adult establishments. But protection
from suppression and protection of the purveyors from criminal pen-
alties need not entail protection from all secondary regulations which
may take account of the character and content of the materials.3 9 Such
a secondary regulation cannot, of course, be permitted if it is covertly
aimed at total suppression4" or if it would have the effect of actual sup-
pression of protected speech or inhibition of the public's access to pro-
tected speech. Moreover, these secondary regulations ought to be per-
mitted only if they promote a substantial public interest, something
more than the mere rational basis accepted in other areas of constitu-
tional adjudication. 4 But none of these invalidating factors seem
present in Young. Adult erotic establishments have been flourishing
in our cities, and it is quite predictable that they will continue to
flourish in Detroit and other cities which choose to adopt Detroit's stra-
tegy. Since there is little likelihood of any actual suppression, Detroit's
rather mild and moderate approach promotes the interests in com-
munity without sacrificing those represented by the first amendment.
We do not abandon the vital interests in free speech by giving this
modest degree of recognition to another interest-the quality of com-
munal life. Liberal democracy needs to recognize a basic propo-
sition of political philosophy that communities, as well as individuals,
have some right to maintain a way of life.
oF OBSCENTY 8-29 (1976).
37. See note 27 supra.
38. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277-83 (1964); cf. Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-54 (1959). See generally Note, The Chilling Effect in
Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808 (1969); Note, The First Amendment Over-
breadth Doctrine, 83 HA.v. L. Rv. 844 (1970).
39. The Supreme Court has wisely left the method of control of obscenity to legis-
lative discretion. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
40. For example, a heavy tax on sexually explicit materials might have this effect.
41. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). A possibility would be
the "substantial governmental interest" test of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968) (upholding regulation which only incidentally affected expression).
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